Contradiction and Abstraction: A reply to Finelli

Christopher J. Arthur

Abstract

Following the publication of my book The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’, and the symposium on it (Historical Materialism 13.2), a critique by Roberto Finelli recently appeared: ‘Abstraction versus Contradiction: Observations on Chris Arthur’s The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’ ‘, Historical Materialism 15.2. Finelli argues that my systematic dialectic is not taken sufficiently far, in that I retain presuppositions not posited by the capitalist totality. Here I argue against Finelli’s closed totality of wholly abstract forms, not least because it affords no realistic exit strategy. I reaffirm that the logic of contradiction is required to conceptualise the capital relation.

My book, The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’, raises two issues.1 What is ‘new’ about this dialectic? – and how does it illuminate Marx’s Capital?

My work starts from a Hegelian-inspired reappropriation of the dialectic. But this interest in Hegel is unconcerned with recovering the grand narrative of Hegel’s philosophy of history and relating it to historical materialism; rather it is focused on Hegel’s Logic and how this fits the method of Marx’s Capital. The effort is to construct a systematic dialectic in order to articulate the relations of a given social order, namely capitalism, as opposed to a historical dialectic studying the rise and fall of social systems.

Now, where the interpretation of Marx’s Capital is concerned, I draw also upon another relatively new tendency in Marxian theory, which emphasizes Marx’s notion of the ‘value form’. In value form theory it is the development of the forms of exchange that is seen as the prime determinant of the capitalist economy rather than the content regulated by it: all the material and technical economic processes are accomplished within definite historically specific social forms. Things, such as commodities, are assigned a social role as mediators of production relations. This is how a category such as value must be understood. The value form is the characteristic social form of commodity capitalist relations. Through the effectivity of form-determination things acquire definite social functions. Marx develops increasingly complex value forms, corresponding to increasingly complex production relations.

Hegel is a natural reference for value form theory because his logic of categories is well suited to a theory of forms. Moreover Hegel’s systematic development of categories is directed towards articulating the structure of a totality, showing how it supports itself in and through the interchanges of its inner ‘moments’. Since all moments of the whole exist synchronically all movement must pertain to their reciprocal support and development. The method of presentation articulates the categories in such a manner as to show how the logic of the system tendentially ensures its completeness through ‘positing’ all its presuppositions. The presentation ends when all the conditions of existence needing to be addressed are comprehended by the entire system of categories developed. Such a system is complete only when it returns to, and accounts for, its starting point.

I argue capital is just such a totality. This is because exchange abstracts from the heterogeneity of commodities and treats them as instances of a universal, namely value. This practical abstraction parallels the way the abstractive power of thought operates; and it gives rise to a homologous structure to logical forms, namely the value forms. Moreover the totalising category here, namely value, develops systematically from its more simple and abstract shapes to its most complex and concrete reality. The dialectic of the value-form, from commodity to money to capital, may be exhibited in accordance with the Hegelian paradigm, I have shown.

However, I go further than just drawing attention to methodological lessons from Hegel’s systematic ordering of categories, as do others. I draw also on his ontology. Hegel is the expert on how an ideality would have to build itself up, moment by moment, into a self-actualising whole. If then, as I believe, capital has in part an ideal reality, then if it can be shown to incarnate Hegel’s blueprint it can claim to be self-sustaining. According to my interpretation capital has a certain conceptuality to it. This ideal aspect springs from the inversion of concrete and abstract characteristic of the system of production for exchange. In positing otherness merely as a moment of it, the totalising logic of capital really imposes itself in such a manner that material and social relationships become inscribed within it. But capital as an ideal totality cannot account for what is in excess of its concept of itself, the concrete richness of social labor, not to mention that of Nature.

While I deploy Hegel’s logic in my reconstruction of Capital, it is important to notice that, on my account, Marx’s criticisms of Hegel still stand. One thinks of i) his 1844 point about the incomprehensibility of the transition from logic to Realphilosophie; ii) his 1845-7 parodies of ‘speculative construction’; iii) his 1857 attack on Hegel for conceiving the real as the product of thought; iv) his difference from Hegel on the self-sufficiency of conceptual forms, expressed in a telling footnote in the first edition of Capital; v) his Afterword to the second edition dissenting from the ‘mystified form’ of Hegel’s dialectic; vi) most importantly, from our present interest, Marx’s Poverty of Philosophy (1847) which complains that in Hegel reality drowned in a world of abstractions.

I do not seek to defend Hegel against all this, as do some Hegelian Marxists (for example, Tony Smith). Rather my argument is that capital does in reality constitute itself through abstraction and the march of abstract forms. Capital is closed in form; hence the relevance of Hegel’s totalising logic. It is just insofar as it might be thought to share this character with Hegel’s logic that it may be criticized in parallel ways to Marx’s critique of Hegel.

In particular, in capitalism too the rule of abstractions predicated on the value form is an appropriate object of critique. In both cases the ontological primacy of the real spells the inability of the ideal to secure itself through positing all its presuppositions. Nonetheless epochally the Idea of capital has objective validity. This means that theory must take its claims seriously and trace how far it succeeds in posting all its presuppositions.

If the realm of value is that of a totality of abstract forms grounded in the peculiar practice of exchange then capital, defined as self-valorising value, is nothing but self-moving abstraction. Yet such abstract forms are socially and materially determining of the content inscribed with them. Form-determination2 is the process whereby the value form posits the material inscribed within it as value, and, more broadly, transforms it so as to make it adequate to the concept of capital. In its universality the value-form functions as a principle of totalisation which impresses its logic on the finite material content. Of course it is not possible to point out capital empirically. Immediately we see only money, factories, workers, and commodities. In this sense capital is a spectre, the presence of an absence.3

In my book I take the view that the totalising Subject of modernity is capital itself. When I say capital is a Subject, this clearly requires some explanation. Obviously capital does not possess consciousness or personality (these it acquires through its form-determination of the person of the capitalist). I mean by the term Subject exactly what Hegel means by it in his logic where he specifies the minimum determinations that are logically required. These are three: 1) a subject, in addressing the material given to it in its practices, must have the power to subsume the singulars under their universal concept; 2) a subject sets itself an aim; 3) a subject must be an Individual, that is, maintain itself as such through totalising its determinations. On the first point, capital subsumes commodities under their universal concept, namely value, when it produces and markets them. On the second point, the structure of capital as self-valorising value is directed towards the production and accumulation of surplus value. On the third point, the term ‘Individual’ is again to be understood logically as that concrete universality that remains the self-same in all its specifications; i.e. totalizes them; in its circuit capital takes on the shape of money capital, production capital, commodity capital, while existing in their unity as a self-positing subject. Moreover capitals are logically unified in a single universal capital comprehending them as I have shown elsewhere.4

Finelli on Capital

The view that capital is a Subject is a position also held by Moishe Postone5 and by Roberto Finelli. All of us also think that in some way this Subject has to be understood in Hegelian terms. However, there are differences between us. In his critique of my book Finelli expresses this by counterposing to my logic of contradiction his own ‘logic of abstraction’. Finelli’s interesting and insightful work has many points of contact with my own. There is indeed much on which we agree. We agree a) that capital is a peculiar Subject, founded in a social process of abstraction; b) that the circle of presupposition and posit6 is how it constitutes itself as a self-grounded power; c) that the world of abstraction is as real as that of the concrete7; d) on the importance of form-determination and its difference from simple material determination.8

We disagree on two major points, it seems to me: first on whether or not capital is a closed totality, and second, concomitantly, on the exit strategy. In addition we disagree about the concept of abstract labour and about the reading of Hegel.

Finelli’s central thesis is that there are two worlds, as follows: ‘With Marx the heart of the dialectic lies in the split of the world into two: world 1, the world of the concrete, a world of human beings and use values, and world 2, the world of an inhuman abstract subject, the world of merely quantitative wealth predicated on the logic of accumulation.’9 However, it turns out that there is only one world because the logic of form-determination, and of positing the presupposition, means that the abstract world has completely colonized that of the concrete, emptying it of reality, leaving only a hysterically over-determined simulacrum of the concrete.

Finelli objects to my account of capital that I do not push the logic of positing the presupposition far enough. While I agree the abstract world takes possession of the concrete, I retain the irreducible difference between the two worlds. Hence Finelli correctly reads my position as follows: ‘For this position, it is a case of a struggle and of a contradiction between subjects [plural] and the world of the concrete, on the one side, and the Subject [capitalized] and the world of the abstract, on the other.’10

He rejects the logic of contradiction because he holds that the logic of positing the presupposition goes all the way down. He says that properly speaking the systematic dialectic does not tolerate the existence of presupposed elements. Such presuppositions must be dogmatic assumptions of a metaphysical or humanist nature. In sum, ‘the logic of abstraction does not tolerate any presupposed element if it is not posited, that is, produced and resignified by the totalising subject’.11

What is my response? To begin with I insist on the reality of inversion. Only given this are there really two worlds. The world of abstraction gains its autonomy and power, as distinct from a set of abstractions epiphenomenal to the real world, only because reality itself is inverted. But this can happen only in social practice; hence the material basis retains its ontological primacy. Even if these abstract forms colonise the concrete effectively, through the process of form-determination, this always presupposes the original materiality of production and distribution, and hence the possibility of putting the world back on its feet, of a return of the repressed.

In the passage last quoted from Finelli there is a fundamental ambiguity. There is a great difference between a Subject that ‘produces’ its world from its own resources, and one that simply ‘resignifies’ relationships already present.

It is important to my account of the ‘two worlds’ that capital, as the totalising Subject, is at home with itself only in the world of forms. At that level it may well be conceded that it is grounded on itself, and achieves closure when producing commodities on the basis of ex nihilo bank credit (value produces value). However, at all points in its circuit the process is borne by matter. This is why capital cannot be granted its claim to be the source of all wealth. This claim pertains only to wealth in its abstract form, accumulated capital. But not to wealth in its reality. The human and natural basis of the economic metabolism remains, regardless of how deeply capital penetrates these spheres, resignifying and reshaping them. Capital is a closed totality only in form; in reality capital cannot posit its presuppositions where its material conditions of existence are concerned (such as the possibility of a surplus product). Yet epochally capital is triumphant, so science has the task of elucidating its logic of self-positing even if this means a certain methodological postponement of the identification of its limits.

The specific case cited by Finelli, when contesting my view that the concrete is ultimately irreducible to the abstract, is that of labour. It might seem that abstract labour is realized only in exchange when the labours embodied in commodities are counted as abstractions of themselves in so far as the commodities are equated in value. However, in my book I argue that value is actual only when the commodities are products of capital; hence the point at which labour becomes abstract must be taken back into production itself as it is value-formed by its location in the circuit of capital. The process of valorisation is borne by the material production process. Considered as the positing of value this process takes the abstract form of the pure activity of value positing. Labour counts now merely as simple movement in time. Just as value inheres in the shell of use value, value positing inheres in the shell of labour. Value abstracts from use value; value-positing abstracts from living labour; the abstract activity substitutes itself for the concrete one. This inversion is splendidly characterised by Marx when he says the worker is time’s carcass. Finelli charges me with empiricism because I stress there is always a gap here. The concept of labour as abstract can never be instantiated perfectly in a material incarnation just because of the irreducible qualitative concrete character of all material production.

His alternative account is strange in that he gives a pseudo-empirical incarnation of the concept; he locates abstract labor in the technical matrix of production by machinery, including the ‘informational machine’. Now it may well be that as a consequence of the form-determination of production discussed above living labour becomes tendentially machine-like; but it always counts formally as abstract regardless of how close is the empirical approximation of the concept.

There is another interesting sense of ‘abstract’, separation out from the whole; in the case of the division of labour imposed on workers in factories the dissociated labours are reunited externally from above; no doubt this empties the work of meaning and results in the indifference of the worker to the specific task assigned. But, again, the labours always count as abstract at whatever level the division of labour is taken.

Hegel and Marx

According to Finelli there is a contrast between the ontologies of Hegel and Marx. For Hegel, he says, the ontological cleavage between Being and Nothing is mediated through absolute negativity. For Marx the ontological cleavage between use value and exchange value is mediated through abstraction/colonisation; this split has not to do with Nothingness but with concrete and abstract. So one ‘is based on the power of … universalisation of the “negative”, the other on the power of universalisation of the “abstract”.’12

In my opinion there is no ontological cleavage between Being and Nothing; indeed they are indistinguishable except as always already sublated in Becoming. The radical ontological cleavage in Hegel is between Thought and Reality; here the identity is merely speculative, in some sense always accomplished, but in experience requiring the labour of the negative to make the bridge in so far as the Concept strives to actualise itself through idealising Reality, presupposed as its own other, but not yet posited as such. It is this contrast which I see as parallel to Marx’s disjunction between use and exchange. Immediately, as Finelli says, ‘exchange value is external to use value: when there is one there is not the other’.13 However, for capital as self-valorising value to actualise itself, it must take possession of the sphere of use value which is presupposed in production and circulation; and a speculative identity of value-in-process on the one hand and the concrete production of use value, on the other, must obtain.

Certainly the constitution of value as an autonomous sphere is by way of abstraction from (or absenting of) use value. But surely it is wrong to distinguish the power of abstraction from the power of the negative, because the generation of an abstract category/form results from the negation of all concrete determinacy. Not merely is all specific use-value abstracted from, but even the unreal abstraction ‘utility’ also. The exchange process carries out an ‘infinitely negative judgement’ on the commodities, whose identity as exchangeables cannot be grounded on anything intrinsic to them. Leaving what as the ground of their Being? Nothingness!!14

Conversely determination is negation (of the universal). For Hegel absolute negativity or negation of the negation characterizes the Subject/Idea which determines/negates itself in some finite shape and then recovers its universality through refusing this fixity and superseding it. The same is true for capital in its circuit (as we saw above). So I do not see the difference between Hegel and Marx where Finelli does.

There is, however, a profound difference between Hegel and Marx, which may be encapsulated as the difference between identity and unity. For Hegel all difference is ultimately self-difference, so there is an identity of identity and difference in the Absolute. Similarly, for capital, living labour is ‘the use value’ of capital, i.e. of capital’s difference from itself as variable capital. But the capital relation is in reality a unity of opposites, namely of the ideal and the material.15

There is a contradiction as soon as we assume the two-worlds are real because each claims to be the truth of the other. For Hegel, Nature has ‘its truth outside itself’ in the Idea. Feuerbach held the contrary view that Nature stood in no need of mediation, whereas the Idea to be actual must mediate itself in its other in order to give itself content. In our case capital makes itself actual, i.e. valorises itself, only through the materiality of production. From its own solipsistic point of view it is therewith a productive power. But clearly it is possible to produce wealth without capital. Nevertheless capital may claim to produce wealth in its current social form namely capital itself. This solipsistic view is both true and false. The self-identity of capital is not ‘really real’ ontologically in that its actuality requires it generate its own content which it cannot fully achieve (albeit it resignifies the material given to it). Conversely the world of living labour is true only virtually, labour actualises itself only in the mode of denial; capital can be understood as its alienated form. The self-constitution of capital and the self-negation of labour are conditions of each other. The capital relation is indeed a relation, whereas each pole claims it is an identity.

The true (the capital relation is a contradiction in essence) and the false (capital is a self-positing totality) ontologies are both real and coexist as moments of one another. Capital says the factory has its truth outside itself in that it mediates capital’s self-valorisation. There is indeed some truth in this. But, just insofar as capital depends on material potentials of labour and nature it cannot be, as it solipsistically imagines, a closed totality, hence it is open to determination from what it necessarily requires of labour; ultimately therefore open to subversion and overthrow from that side of the relation.

Where is value posited?

There is a complication in the relation of my work to that of Finelli. Following the value-form tradition, I find the origin of abstraction in exchange and circulation, which then imposes itself on production. Finelli, in contrast, locates abstraction first and foremost in production itself: it is only there that the value abstraction becomes ‘practically true’. An important consequence of his view is that he sees the capital Subject as lying behind the superficiality of circulation. Indeed he goes so far as to say that value is posited only as a result of the relation of domination in production: ‘It is surplus value… which explains value and not vice versa’.16

This seems strange: even grammatically ‘surplus-value’ presupposes ‘value’. I believe Finelli has got into trouble here because of a fundamental ambivalence in Marxist theory itself. As it happens, Helmut Reichelt has posed the issue exceptionally clearly in a recent article in Historical Materialism. He finds in Marx’s Grundrisse:

  1. exchange-value-positing in and through ‘simple circulation’;
  2. exchange-value-positing in and through the employment of labour by capital.17

In my opinion Marx never satisfactorily resolves this problem of the constitution of value. Many readers of Capital miss this completely because Marx moves too quickly to identify value with labour in the course of the notorious ‘third thing’ argument. From the fact that a commodity has many exchange values Marx supposes that these express ‘something equal’, a unitary value that underlies the various exchange values. As a quite distinct separate step he then grounds this value on labour, therewith tacitly presupposing, as Reichelt notes, that commodities are products of capital, and hence posited as values already.

The problem may be expressed in terms of the essence/appearance couplet. On the one hand value appears in the form of value, notably price; on the other hand the value-form as a whole is itself the shape in which social labour appears. There seems to be a double retreat from the surface of things: exchange-value – value – labour. In my opinion the resolution of these difficulties may be achieved by a more precise distinction between the couplets form/content and form/matter. The relation of value to exchange-value is a logically tight conceptual necessity: value as content necessarily requires the form of exchange-value and conversely. However, the relation between value and material labour is not a conceptual necessity because it is perfectly possible for labour not to take the form of value. Conversely it is logically possible that value be an empty form, prey to contingencies (as in the supply-demand paradigm). That in this society there is a law of value grounded on labour expenditures is discovered by theory. Theory also elucidates the way in which the material inscribed in the value form has to be made adequate to it through its form-determination as content, always a struggle to achieve.

Bearing all this in mind, how is the place where value is posited to be located? Value as pure form is posited in developed circulation. But new value arises in production under the impulse of capital to valorise itself (hence the possibility of posing surplus value as prior to value). The general formula of capital grounds itself on production thereby giving itself a law of motion, formally determined through the competition of many capitals and materially on the productive power of labour.

Finelli thinks capital is a productive power which simply expresses itself in circulation. But this is not coherent because production is value formed already within the overall circuit of capital. If it is right to ground value-positing on the pumping out of labour in the immediate production process, this does not mean circulation is secondary, because positing the pure (empty) form of value is logically prior to positing surplus value, albeit the magnitude of value is determined only through the competition of capitals for a slice of the social surplus product.

To sum up, I say the following in my book:

‘The form of capital explains the drive for valorization; but it cannot in itself, i.e. as pure form, bring it about, produce it. But if production is the overriding moment, this is not production as a factor external to, and causally effective upon, other factors, it is production as mediated by circulation whose form it internalises. Hence, methodologically, the exposition describes a circle: commodity circulation (form of value) – circulation reflected into production (valorization) – circulation as a moment of production (realization of value).’18

Abstraction and contradiction

A great strength of Finelli’s work is his critique of post-modern society characterized by a hollow simulacrum of the concrete. He rightly attributes its emptiness to the power of the abstract Subject.19 Nevertheless I have a different take on the challenge to that, retaining in this respect a logic of contradiction.

Finelli’s objection to my position is that a Marxism of contradiction must be situated in a humanist problematic, an anthropology ‘based on the ontological primacy of the labouring subject as concrete collective agent, and on the irreducible opposition between the (taken-for-granted) communitarianism of the productive forces and the private restriction of the relations of production.’20 However, in the chapter on the negation of the negation in my book I took care to argue that these social determinations are created by capital itself albeit ‘virtually’ in the mode of denial. The constitution of the proletariat as a collective potential counter-subject is a historical product of capital’s own development, the flip side of real subsumption, if you like. Moreover the same point applies when the historically developed sociality of productive forces is concerned.

In the Theses on Feuerbach Marx says that the standpoint of the old materialism is the isolated individual but the standpoint of the new materialism is social humanity. However, this sociality is displaced because capital has constituted itself as the objective ground of human being. The non-actual character of this subverted sociality means that its standpoint has a certain speculative character which is at the same time practical because it is immanent in the present order.

Moreover if there is to be some immanent source of change, capital cannot be conceived as a closed totality; yet this is surely the consequence of Finelli’s ambition to demonstrate that capital posits all its presuppositions; in such a case there is no exit.

Very oddly, notwithstanding this, Finelli does have a perspective of change. Even more oddly, despite his abjuration of ‘humanism’ in the first part of his critique, he ends up calling for ‘a new anthropology’. He advances a demand for the recognition of the uniquely individual character of human beings. Finelli counterposes this to what he calls the abstract materialism of needs. This anthropology of poverty issues in a demand for equal satisfaction, in effect in this way failing to overcome the present rule of abstraction. Finelli replaces this with ‘the immaterial need’ for recognition of the incomparability of human beings. This new anthropology issues in the right of everyone to see their singularity respected and developed, the liberation of the difference of individual subjectivities.21

Thus the inevitable consequence of his closed totality is that he falls into dualism when he comes to discuss the exit from capitalism. The ‘new anthropology’ appears from outside the closed totality of capital; yet it is supposed to contest it.

Moreover it seems to me there is a striking fetishisation of the singular here, which philosophically complements Finelli’s rejection of the abstract universal, and politically simply replicates one pole of those existing contradictions of capital Finelli already indicated. Capitalism in its surface forms not only tries to simplify everything to ‘one size fits all’, it also inconsistently appeals precisely to the consumers’ hunger to have their individuality recognized when it says the product is ‘just for you’ because you are ‘special’ (if only in your own eyes). Finelli’s fetishisation of the singular does not escape the framework of capital’s false concreteness. Now if we look to Marx we find a much more nuanced account of human being in which the individual is always a ‘social individual’; even where bourgeois conditions promote an asocial sociality; the wealth of an individual, he says, depends on the wealth of his real connections. I concur with Finelli in his impatience with the Left tradition that promotes equality. (Marx made clear on many occasions his disdain for that tradition.) But the choice is not between identity and difference. Individuals flourish only in and through the community.

However, more important is the question of agency, or specifically, what role is class struggle to be given in a theory that depicts capital as a self-positing totality.

We both agree that capital is the true ‘Subject’ of modernity. But we disagree about its surpassing. Finelli has it coming externally through social subjects with a different project. I see in the proletariat the counter-subject created by capital itself as its repressed other, virtually present if empirically negated, as the ground of a self-transcending project of emancipation from, rather than of, wage-labour.


References

  • Arthur, Christopher J. 2002a, The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’, HM Book Series, Leiden: Brill.
  • Arthur Christopher J. 2002b, ‘Capital, competition, and many capitals’, Chapter 6 in The Culmination of ‘Capital’, Eds Geert Reuten and Martha Campbell, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
  • Arthur, Christopher J. 2004, ‘Subject and Counter-Subject’, Historical Materialism 12.3.
  • Arthur, Christopher J. (forthcoming), ‘The possessive spirit of capital: subsumption/inversion/contradiction’ in Re-reading Marx: New perspectives after the critical edition, Eds Riccardo Bellofiore and Roberto Fineschi; Basingstoke: Palgrave.
  • Bellofiore, Riccardo and Roberto Finelli 1998 ‘Capital, Labour and Time’ in Marxian Economics: A Reappraisal (Volume 1 Method, Value and Money) edited by R. Bellofiore, Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s.
  • Finelli, Roberto 2006, ‘Le circle du “présupposé-posé’ dans Le Capital de Marx’, in Dialectiques aujourd’hui, Eds Bertell Ollman and Lucien Sève, Paris: Espaces Marx, Editions Syllepse.
  • Finelli, Roberto 2007, ‘Abstraction versus Contradiction: Observations on Chris Arthur’s The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’ ’, Historical Materialism 15.2.
  • Marx, Karl 1976, Capital Volume I, trans. B. Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
  • Reichelt, Helmut 2007, ‘Marx’s Critique of Economic Categories: Reflections on the Problem of Validity in the Dialectical Method of Presentation in Capital’, Historical Materialism 15.4.

 

  1. Arthur 2002a.
  2. The term itself is present in Marx’s Grundrisse, especially where subsumption is discussed, but does not appear explicitly in Capital, I believe, although I think it does illuminate its argument.
  3. In the same vein Finelli says capital is an ‘invisible subject’ perceptible only through its effects. Finelli 2007, p. 67.
  4. Arthur 2002b.
  5. For my assessment of Postone see Arthur 2004.
  6. These terms were introduced to the English discussion in Bellofiore and Finelli 1998.
  7. I tend to speak of the first here as ‘ideality’ where he talks of ‘spiritualism’, but I am happy to equate capital with Hegel’s Absolute Spirit.
  8. Die Formbestimmung: a new category of a new Marxism’ Finelli 2007, p. 61ff.
  9. Finelli 2006, p. 55.
  10. Finelli 2007, p. 65.
  11. Finelli 2007, p. 66.
  12. Finelli 2007, p. 70.
  13. Finelli 2007, p. 70.
  14. Arthur 2002a, p.160-61.
  15. For the contradictions here see Arthur (forthcoming).
  16. Finelli 2007, pp. 69-71.
  17. Reichelt 2007, p. 9; but he is wrong to say the expression ‘simple circulation’ is ‘not found in Capital at all’; it is to be seen there when Marx makes the transition to production from ‘simple circulation’ (Marx 1976, p. 280); moreover it is implicit in the first page when commodity relations are addressed.
  18. Arthur 2002a, p. 33.
  19. Finelli 2007, pp. 66-69.
  20. Finelli 2007, p. 66.
  21. Finelli 2007, pp. 72-73